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Invisible enemies, wars without winners: when 
‘khaki elections’ fail 
 
Dr James Morrison 
 
Troops on the streets, covert Cobra briefings, terror threat raised to 
‘critical’. Semantic salami-slicing by security top brass about whether code 
red means another terrorist attack ‘is’ or merely ‘may be’ imminent. 
Baleful words of defiance from the Downing Street podium about the need 
to defend ‘our values, our country and our way of life’.  
 
Two weeks before polling day, Theresa May and Amber Rudd’s politically 
calculated reply to the carnage in Manchester arguably bore all the 
symbolism of what Policing the Crisis memorably dubbed ‘law and order 
panic’. From its ‘enemy within’ rhetoric to its authoritarian actions, the 
Government’s default battle-lines starkly echoed the apocalyptic 
responses from politicians, judges and law-enforcers that pepper Stuart 
Hall et al’s atomization of an earlier ‘crisis’ of values, country and way of 
life – one played out through a distinctly 1970s cocktail of street crime, 
strikes, protests and (periodic) IRA bombs.  
 
Of course, there is much that is different about the nature of today’s 
marauding ‘folk devils’ – not least that, compared to the largely specious 
threat posed by the central bogeymen of Policing the Crisis (black 
‘muggers’), our latest enemy within, ‘radical Islamist terrorism’, is real (if 
also simplistically racialized and, at times, exaggerated). The more 
‘militarized’ nature of the present threat also allows the state and its 
agencies to conflate law and order and defence under an overarching 
umbrella of ‘security’ – both in framing the problem and prescribing policy 
solutions. Faced with a back-pedalling pacifist as her principal rival – one 
repeatedly (if disingenuously) accused of opposing ‘shoot-to-kill’ policing 
on Britain’s streets – by the time terrorists struck again, less than two 
weeks after the Manchester attack, Downing Street’s ‘strong and stable’ 
incumbent should have made light weight of mobilizing a wave of public 
scepticism about Jeremy Corbyn’s principled, but presentationally opaque, 
nuances. Indeed, in her fleet-footed move to take ownership of the earlier 
terror threat upgrade – appropriating the right to announce it from the 
independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) – May had shown 
every sign of following the Crosby crib-sheet to the letter. Similarly, her 
swift deployment of battle-clad troops onto Britain’s streets symbolized a 
readiness to revive the ‘war on terror’ discourse long since publicly 
abandoned by UK ministers, with the armoured trappings of a state of 
emergency. 
 
But, for all the ‘strong and stable’ imagery, Churchillian grand-standing 
and warnings of dire peril if ‘terrorist sympathizer’ Corbyn were elected, 
this was never going to be a clear-cut khaki election. For one thing, the 
rhetorical devices used to construct one were barely fit for purpose. With 
the image of May’s ‘snap election’ statement still fresh in voters’ minds, 
and amid criticism of her reluctance to meet ordinary people or debate her 
fellow leaders, her Number 10 podium now looked to be more protective 
barricade than public-facing platform. Even the mediatized ‘spectacle’ of 
her dispatches from Cobra seemed more transparently stage-managed 
than usual – with wider than usual tabloid exposure of the acronym’s 
meaning, ‘Cabinet Office Briefing Room A’, betraying a level of 
bureaucratic banality more redolent of Yes, Prime Minister than Graham 
Greene or Ian Fleming. 
 
More importantly, what marked out the historical Tory khaki triumphs of 
1900 and 1983 and the more pyrrhic 1918 win for Lloyd George’s 
controversial coalition was that each played out against recognizable 
iterations of conventional warfare: with, in turn, fixed bayonets, trench 
warriors and seaborne taskforces vividly mobilized against ominous, all-
too-visible enemies. By contrast, war against Daesh and its adherents – 
invariably home-grown guerrillas capable of living (and plotting) 
undetected among us – is a wholly different proposition. Quite apart from 
the now widely recognized absurdity of waging war on an abstraction – 
‘terror’ – what can victory ever hope to look like against a phantom 
enemy? And it is victory, above all else – dressed up as military conquest 
or the mere restoration of law and order – on which success in elections 
fought on securitized agendas depends. 
